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In 1989-91 the geo-ideological contestation between two blocs was swept away, together 
with the ideology of civil war and its concomitant Cold War played out on the larger stage. 
Paradoxically, while the domestic sources of Cold War confrontation have been 
transcended, its external manifestations remain in the form of a ‘legacy’ geopolitical contest 
between the dominant hegemonic power (the United States) and a number of potential rising 
great powers, of which Russia is one. The post-revolutionary era is thus one of a ‘cold 
peace’. A cold peace is a mimetic Cold War. In other words, while a Cold War accepts 
the logic of conflict in the international system and between certain protagonists in 
particular, a cold peace reproduces the behavioural patterns of a Cold War but suppresses 
acceptance of the logic of behaviour. A cold peace is accompanied by a singular stress on 
notions of victimhood for some and undigested and bitter victory for others. The 
perceived victim status of one set of actors provides the seedbed for renewed conflict, 
while the ‘victory’ of the others cannot be consolidated in some sort of relatively 
unchallenged post-conflict order. The ‘universalism’ of the victors is now challenged by 
Russia’s neo-revisionist policy, including the defence not so much of Westphalian 
notions of sovereignty but the espousal of an international system with room for multiple 
systems (the Schmittean pluriverse). 
 
 
The world today faces enormous threats as the organisations and systems established to 
manage the Cold War order become increasingly dysfunctional in the post-Cold War era, 
and indeed to some degree these institutions themselves generate a state of affairs that we 
shall call a ‘cold peace’. 1 At the heart of the contemporary cold peace are Russo-Western 
relations, which remain in a no-man’s-land in which there is neither the full-scale 
creation of a new political community nor an openly acknowledged conflictual 
relationship. If a Cold War is one that the immediate participants fear to fight directly, 
although ready to engage in any number of proxy wars, a cold peace is a far more fragile 
system of international order. A cold peace is an unstable geopolitical truce in which the 
fundamental problems of a post-conflict international order have not been resolved. 
While a Cold War accepts the logic of competition, a cold peace proceeds on the 
assumption that problems have been resolved, and this assumption itself becomes the 
cause of renewed conflict since it seeks to embed a particular hegemonic formation as 
universally applicable for all. In keeping with the liminal status of Russo-Western 
                                                 
1 I am grateful for the exceptionally detailed and helpful comments of the anonymous reviewers. 
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relations, interactions veer between the cooperative to the antagonistic, with an unstable 
combination of both mostly operating simultaneously. No party wishes to repudiate the 
possibility of greater co-operation, but neither is able to repudiate the sources of the 
antagonism.  
 
What is a cold peace? 
 
In certain respects the interwar period from 1918 was a cold peace, and its failings led to 
renewed global conflict in 1939 (cf. Ikenberry 2001). It was not just Germany that was 
treated as a defeated power, since following the Great War Soviet Russia was also 
excluded from the congress of the victors. Equally, it appeared that after the end of the 
Cold War post-communist Russia appeared too often a superfluous, and troublesome, 
accessory to the new dispensation. Russia is at the heart of the cold peace, although the 
cold peace encompasses problems that are not confined to a single country (Korinman 
and Laughland (eds) 2008). Like the Cold War, ultimately the cold peace is a global 
problem with global implications. In its first years of independence after 1991 Russia was 
essentially a status quo power, although from the first there were clear signs that the 
dominant elite interpretation of post-Cold War international order differed significantly 
from that prevalent in the Western community. In the West the universalistic normative 
values of democracy and human rights were associated with the enlargement of an 
existing geopolitical formation. For a brief period during Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘New 
Thinking’ and in the very early stage of post-communism, this view was compatible with 
Russia’s own aspirations. Andrei Kozyrev, Russia’s first foreign minister, insisted that 
Russia had no national interests outside of ‘all-human values’. This period has been 
dubbed ‘romantic’ but it might better be characterised as idealistic. It sought to base 
policy on a set of universal ideals based on human rights, national self-determination, and 
the belief that the end of the Cold War was a common victory. Soviet ideology gave way 
to a democratic idealism, and policy remained removed from the harsh geopolitical 
realities of the world in which the newly-independent Russian state found itself. 
This idealistic phase did not endure long. Already in Stockholm on 14 December 
1992 Kozyrev administered an alarming dose of ‘shock diplomacy’ when he adopted a 
faux persona and delivered an address to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE), including NATO foreign ministers, mimicking the attitudes of the ‘old 
thinking’. He threatened to use force against other former Soviet republics and accused 
NATO of interfering in its back yard. He described former Soviet territory as ‘a post-
imperial space where Russia has to defend its interests by all available means, including 
military and economic ones’ (‘Diplomats Shocked by Kozyrev Ploy’, 1992). The 
intention was to make the delegates aware of what they could expect if they continued 
with their perceived uncooperative policies towards Russia. The charade in the event 
turned into a very real premonition of what would in due course become the cold peace. 
The incident demonstrates that Russia, although naively and certainly idealistically, was 
already prepared to challenge the prevailing modalities of international order. The acting 
out of possible scenarios only reinforced the liminal nature of the period, and suggests 
that there was nothing predetermined about the way that Russia developed later. This 
attempt to demonstrate the danger of slipping back into a renewed era of confrontation 
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was vitiated by the other powers, and international politics soon settled back into 
customary patterns. 
This early phase, however, demonstrates that Russia, however naively and 
certainly idealistically, tried to challenge the prevailing modalities of international order, 
an episode that suggests that there is nothing predetermined about the way that Russia 
developed later. This attempt was vitiated by the other powers, and international politics 
soon settled back into customary patterns.  
As part of a renewed assertiveness, Kozyrev went on to argue that Russia could 
be a democratic post-Cold War great power pursuing a non-ideological definition of 
national interests while accepting that this could sometimes entail elements of 
competition with the West. This tough approach was vividly manifested in his refusal in 
November 1994 in Brussels to sign documents already agreed with NATO concerning the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. Attempts by the West to discredit the pursuit of 
Russia’s ‘normal’ great power interests by forever raising the spectre of a revival of the 
Cold War, according to Boris Yeltsin a month later at the Budapest summit of what 
became at that time the Organisation for security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) , 
threatened precisely to lead to the emergence of a ‘cold peace’ (Kozyrev, 1995). There 
had thus been a window of opportunity in which the Cold War could have been 
transcended to establish a new dynamic in Russo-Western relations. Instead, on both 
sides attitudes hardened, and an extended period of cold peace ensued. Russia returned to 
its traditional aspirations to be a great power of a very specific type (the question of 
derzhavnichestvo is examined by Ortmann 2011; for a historical discussion, see Rich 
2009). The cold peace is characterised by powerful inherent tensions and endlessly 
iterated clashes of perceptions and misperceptions as Russia seeks to find its place in an 
unforgiving international system (Clunan 2009). 
The tensions accompanying the search for a new relationship between Russia and 
what is conventionally called the West (internal differentiation will not be examined 
here) gave rise ultimately to a growing strain of what I we call neo-revisionism. This 
differs from traditional ideas of revisionism, since Russia makes no claim to revise the 
existing international order, but in a paradoxical inversion of the original Helsinki 
process, demands that the leading powers abide by the mutually-established rules of the 
international system, as well as claiming a no less leading place in that system. It is for 
this reason that Russia is far from being a consistently revisionist power, and thus much 
of the literature on bandwagoning and balancing, while entirely relevant, needs to be seen 
in context. Russia is a neo-revisionist power, happy (for the time being at least) to 
endorse American hegemony as long as what it perceives to be its vital interests and 
prestige are acknowledged. A superpower creates alliances rather than joins them and 
generates norms rather than obeys them, and Russia’s reduced status certainly cannot be 
placed in that category and thus stands in an ambiguous relationship with both alliances 
and norms. 
Russia’s endless quest to be recognised as a great power reveals its own 
ambivalence over whether it is worthy of the status. Like Japan a generation ago, Russia 
remains what Shogu Suzuki calls a ‘frustrated great power’ (Suzuki 2008). China also 
finds itself in this category. Its ‘quiet rise’ is now accompanied by some noisy 
expressions of the assertion of sovereignty-centred view of international politics. As 
becomes the longest continuously-existing state in the world, it will let no one else 
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determine the appropriate standards of civilisation. As Perry Anderson notes in a brilliant 
recent essay, ‘If the twentieth century was dominated, more than by any other single 
event, by the trajectory of the Russian Revolution, the twenty-first will be shaped by the 
outcome of the Chinese Revolution’ (Anderson 2010, 59). The West’s relations with 
China moved from ‘cold war’ and  since the 2000s has increasingly assumed the 
character of a cold peace, but the dynamics of that particular case is not the subject of this 
paper. 
In broad terms a cold peace can be described as an unstable geopolitical truce, 
typically found in inter-war periods, where the ‘defeat’ of the one side is not accepted as 
legitimate, while the ‘victory’ of the other side cannot be consolidated. Thus in certain 
respect the twenty years’ crisis of the inter-war years, described by E. H. Carr in his book 
of that title (2001), can be described as an example of a cold peace. Few if any of the 
fundamental structural problems facing European and global security were resolved at 
that time, provoking in the end a renewed bout of conflict, prefigured by Japan’s invasion 
of Manchuria in 1931 and the onset of the Spanish civil war in 1936. A cold peace is a 
mimetic Cold War. In other words, while a Cold War accepts the logic of conflict in the 
international system and between certain protagonists in particular, a cold peace 
reproduces the behavioural patterns of a Cold War but suppresses acceptance of the logic 
of that behaviour. 
 A cold peace is accompanied by a singular stress on notions of victimhood for 
some and undigested and bitter victory for others. The perceived victim status of one set 
of actors provides the seedbed for renewed conflict, while ‘victory’ cannot be 
consolidated in some sort of relatively unchallenged post-conflict order. The reappraisal 
of the past becomes ‘historical revisionism’, a term that has both a neutral scholarly 
meaning as the reappraisal of the past in the light of new evidence, but it can also mean 
the attempt to rewrite history in the light of current political concerns accompanied by the 
distortion or suppression of essential historical facts (Kopeček (ed.) 2008). The whole 
post-communist world is now engaged in a frenzy of historical revisionism, in both 
senses of the term, as each newly independent state creates the appropriate national 
narratives. Certain cases have become exemplary, notably the debate over the Holodomor 
(the man-made famine) in Ukraine in the early 1930s, and the background to the Nazi-
Soviet Pact of August 1939 and the subsequent incorporation of the Baltic republics into 
the Soviet Union. A number of post-communist countries present their recent sufferings 
as ‘genocides’, notably in the Baltic states, the Caucasus and Ukraine, which then  
become the subject of international politics in the form of recognition/denial disputes 
(Finkel 2010). The blanket condemnation of the communist experience, without shade or 
nuance, is symptomatic of this attempt to ‘other’ not just the geopolitical influence of the 
Soviet Union and now Russia, but also to render each country’s own past as somehow 
alien to the current order and an aberration from some essentialist definition of national 
identity. The politicisation of history is one of the defining features of a mimetic Cold 
War as battles between historians reveals the suppressed violence between the 
protagonists. 
 The problem of historical assessment gains added valence at times when the bases 
of social order changes, and thus the appreciation of the national narrative changes to 
sustain contemporary needs. As Greenleaf and Golburt put it, ‘A preoccupation with 
memory arises when fear of amnesia is in the air’ (2009, 744). Russian history is 
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characterised by repeated cycles of repression and censorship which has fostered ‘a 
conception of memory as a heroic act of consciousness’, but in addition to this ‘dissident’ 
narrative memory studies in Russia today draw on aspects of daily life and material 
culture to provide an account of how power is embedded in everyday practices. 
Contemporary memory studies have a strongly mimetic component, defined as ‘those 
aspects of memory that consciously or unreflectively represent the past precisely by 
repeating its patterns as well as the narrative commonplaces of its commemoration’. Thus 
the mimetic component of remembering is focused on the ‘repetitive cultural rituals, 
formal traditions, and bodily habits that cause past experience to be replicated in the 
present as “second nature” – not as heroic or transcendent acts of consciousness’ 
(Greenleaf and Golburt 2009, 744). In the Russian context this takes on a deeper meaning 
since the whole history of Russia’s engagement with Western modernity has been 
accompanied by a permanent fear of adaptive mimesis: that its own ‘authentic’ identity 
would be lost as it not only copied Western models of development but denigrated its 
own customs. The revolt against universalising discourses reflects an innate Platonic 
conception of mimesis as mere imitation and estrangement from truth and reinforces the 
search for a genuinely original Russian tradition in art and politics.2 
 This is precisely the distinction drawn in nineteenth century Germany between 
Kultur and Zivilisation; one as authentic while the other is adaptive and mimetic. This is 
the dilemma that faces all late developing societies as the model of modernity is 
established elsewhere. The tension between adaptation and particularity, typically taking 
the form of the endlessly repeated Westerniser/Slavophile meme, reveals that 
contemporary Russia remains locked in a permanent catch-up cycle while desperately 
looking for an alternative. A cold peace is thus rooted in incommensurable understanding 
of the specificity of a particular historical epoch. For some it is savoured as a victory, 
accompanied by rhetoric about building a land ‘fit for heroes’ or representing the ‘end of 
history’ when the belief system of the victors is generalised as universally applicable to 
all. For others, it is a period of loss and disorientation, in which resentment against the 
triumphalism of the self-declared victors is nurtured and the institutions in which the 
alleged victory is consolidated are execrated. 
 A cold peace, like a Cold War of which it is the mimetic twin, is based on an 
implacable axiological logic: that is, a quasi-Gnostic appreciation of good and evil, rather 
than a more pluralistic understanding of the contingent and culturally constructed nature 
of social order (Rossbach 1999). A cold peace is not simply the reproduction of dualism 
in ideology and bipolarity in the state system, but a set of deeply embedded but opposed 
value systems, each rooted in a geopolitical vision of its own, accompanied by the 
denigration of the other as somehow civilisationally less valid and legitimate, if not 
civilisationally less competent (Sztompka 1998). Mimesis indeed is a form of learning 
where one society begins by copying another and thus gradually adapts its norms and 
standards of behaviour. The ‘other’ in that context is reduced to the status of ‘pupil’, and 
the dominant power becomes the teacher (Prozorov 2006). Thus the mimetic character of 
the cold peace also contains a socialising function, and this is reflected in the neo-
revisionist character of contemporary Russia: not entirely set against the existing order, 
                                                 
2 For Aristotle mimesis plays a more positive role, comparable to a child learning by mimicry and 
for humanity as a whole, as Charles Darwin stressed, it is a tool for learning about the empirical 
reality of the outside world. See Greenleaf and Golburt, ‘Introduction’, pp. 744-5. 
 6 
yet undergoing a painful process of mimetic adaptation in a competitive, but not typically 
conflictual, geopolitical environment.  
 
The cold peace in practice 
 
The contemporary cold peace is characterised by numerous features. Above all, Russia’s 
assertion of the ideology of ‘multipolarity’ is implicitly directed against the putative 
unipolar hegemony of the remaining superpower, the United States, accompanied by 
stress on the need for ‘equality’ between the great powers. Much of this rhetoric is 
reminiscent of the strident claims made by Germany and Japan as they sought to justify 
their entry into an already crowded international system in the period before the Great 
War. 
 Russia’s relative isolation and competition with the West (although this 
competition, as noted above, is accompanied by a learning and socialisation process), 
above all with the United States and Britain, has provoked a search for new partners, 
notably China and India, as well as gestures to countries like Venezuela under Hugo 
Chávez. These initiatives are an attempt to create some sort of mimetic balancing order: 
one that does not genuinely threaten the existing hegemonic great powers, but signals 
Russia’s dissatisfaction with that dominance. It also tries to build alliances on the basis of 
‘legacy’ relationships, notably by re-establishing links with former partners, notably 
Cuba and Syria, and even to a degree with Vietnam. This is complemented by the 
development of closer ties with medium-rank powers such as Turkey and Brazil. Russia 
has become the potential core of a new ‘union of the outsiders’, with Turkey a privileged 
member of this club as its ‘neo-Ottoman’ ambitions in the Middle East and elsewhere 
develop (Sakwa 2010). 
 There are also attempts to consolidate post-Soviet space into Russian-sponsored 
integration projects, a region-building endeavour that counteracts but which could also 
complement that of the European Union (EU). The Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) and the Russian-Belarusian union are complemented by the more effective 
Cooperative Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Customs Union, while Putin’s 
declaration in October 2011 in favour of the creation of a Eurasian Union signalled that 
integration projects in post-Soviet Eurasia would be his priority in his third term as 
president (Putin 2011a). This is accompanied by opposition to former Soviet countries 
(excluding the Baltic republics) joining western-centred security bodies, above all NATO 
(Freire and Kanet (eds) 2010). A competitive dynamic in the post-Soviet space is assumed 
by both sides, while neither wishes to enter into open conflict, let alone military 
hostilities, with the other. Again, this can be described as a mimetic reprise of the ‘great 
game’, where the forms of rivalry are re-enacted but without the spirit of desperation that 
characterised the original in the nineteenth century. 
 In the immediate post-1945 years Russia (in its Soviet guise) was faced by a 
choice between some sort of domestic thaw accompanied by international integration, or 
the maintenance of domestic repression and international hostility (Gorlizki and 
Khlevniuk 2004). The country took the latter path. After 1991 Russia was faced with a 
similar, although far less stark, choice, which could be posed as between liberal 
democracy and international integration, or the restoration of a traditional authoritarian 
regime. Society was once again suffocated by the state, and modernisation programmes 
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relied on state intervention from above and were unable to release the full potential of 
modernisation from below, or indeed the middle, by releasing entrepreneurial energy 
freed from the clammy hand of the bureaucracy, accompanied by rampant corruption and 
insecure property rights (Frye 2010). The contemporary cold peace is indeed 
accompanied by the tension between liberal domestic development and the assertion of 
perceived great power interests (Neumann 2008). The fact that such a systemic tension 
persists indicates the structural roots of the problem. 
 The structural nature of the cold peace lies in part in issues of status and dignity.  
Only Russia (and possibly Serbia) endured a major perceived geopolitical loss at the end 
of the Cold War, accompanied by the assumed denigration of national dignity 
(Tsygankov 2012). In this context, even minor slights by the major powers can provoke 
an exaggerated response, while challenges, such as the placing of a third tier ABM 
system in Poland and the Czech republic, accompanied by plans to extend NATO into the 
heartlands of Russia’s historic statehood in Ukraine, as well in Georgia, was seen to 
represent not only a systemic challenge to Russia’s great power aspirations, but an 
existential threat to Russia’s very existence.3 NATO declarations that enlargement does 
not threaten Russia’s security suppresses recognition of the insecurities generated by 
what indeed is not intended to be a threat. This blindness prompted Russia’s military 
response over South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008, a conflict which Russia felt it 
had to fight if it were to be taken seriously as a power at all (Asmus 2010; Cornell and 
Starr (eds) 2009; and for a more balanced analysis, Hamilton 2009). 
 As far as the Western powers are concerned, the cold peace emerged out of 
Russia’s democratic backsliding (the systemic explanation for the cold peace). Changes 
in Russia’s domestic environment from this perspective throw doubt on its credentials as 
a fully paid-up member of the Western-led international community. Immediate concerns 
about the stability of Russia’s democratic institutions and the persistence of democratic 
practices quickly spill over into questions about the availability of a political culture of 
democracy, and indeed about Russia’s civilisational identity as a member of the Western 
community of nations (Tsygankov 2007, 2008). These questions gained added force 
when Russia sought to reassert itself in spheres where it considered it had legitimate 
interests. Russia’s response - that democracy was an internal matter and the pace of 
Russia’s transition was not something to be judged by outsiders - was not one to increase 
the confidence of Western partners. Thus the cold peace is characterised by a negative 
dynamic: internal consolidation delegitimated external assertion; while external 
assertiveness seems only to demonstrate democratic retrenchment at home and a way of 
imposing an artificial consensus. Differences between mature democratic countries do 
not typically spill over into confrontation, whereas with countries whose relationship is 
characterised by a cold peace, conflict is an ever-present reality. 
 
Russia and the problem of post-Cold War international order 
 
When ‘Russia’ was great it was not Russia; when it was Russia, it was not great. Although 
not entirely true, this apothegm reveals one of the central paradoxes of contemporary 
Russia. For two centuries before 1917 Russia was officially termed an empire, thus 
                                                 
3 This is the way Medvedev described it to the members of the Valdai International Discussion 
Club on 12 September 2008, personal notes. 
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explicitly denoting an entity that in terms of the multiplicity of its peoples and its political 
order was something other than the nation-states that were beginning to emerge elsewhere in 
Europe. Russia was officially the core of the Russian Empire and the heart of the Tsarist 
autocracy, and as a nation-state it barely existed (Hosking 1997). After 1917 for some 
seventy years Russia the subject once again in effect disappeared, subsumed officially into a 
larger entity called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from 1922 to 1991. The 
Russia that emerged in 1991 was in many respects an entirely new country: its borders 
corresponded neither with the ethnic settlement of Russians in the former Soviet space nor 
with the historic contours of a previous state. The essential ambiguity about Russia’s status 
as a nation and over the character of the state spills over into the country’s relations with the 
rest of the world (Shevel 2011). 
 
Continuers versus innovators 
 
The post-Cold War era is based on a fundamental division of opinion. On the one hand 
there are those who can be dubbed ‘continuers’, who argue that despite the end of the 
Cold War the institutions of the West European security community should be stretched 
to the East, representing in their view the extension of the zone of peace and prosperity 
that had been nurtured in their shade for half a century. Such an approach eschews 
mimetic adaptation, since the process is largely one of mechanical adoption of an existing 
set of rules, even though they may have been devised in different times for different 
purposes. For most East European countries this mechanical appropriation of an existing 
legacy was relatively unproblematic and coincided with their self-image as ‘Western’ and 
their post-communist programme of the ‘return to Europe’; but for the bulk of the post-
Soviet states there could be no such easy transfer. Russia would inevitably be the core of 
an alternative region-building endeavour if it wished to be ‘Russia’, as traditionally 
understood in terms of the continuer state to the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. 
The two types of continuation represent a deeper sub-text to the cold peace. 
Andrew Cottey (2007) is one of the most eloquent defenders of the Western 
continuer point of view. He argues that the European security community (encompassing 
the EU and NATO) embodies a pattern of behaviour which has demilitarised relations 
between its members, and European states no longer consider each other military 
adversaries. This represents a qualitative change in European affairs, and its 
achievements in Cottey’s view should not wantonly be squandered. Wars in Yugoslavia 
and various conflicts in the former Soviet Union only reinforced the relevance of the 
European security community. The West European zone of peace could be extended by a 
policy of patient but persistent conditionality that would gradually socialise the periphery 
to the values of the core. Thus the European system represents a crucial part of the 
Atlantic security order with a logic and rationale of its own. There are growing problems, 
however, since the EU increasingly imbues the European security order with its values, if 
not its norms, and thus there is a potential divergence with the militarism that is at the 
core of NATO’s mission. 
The threats to the European system include the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, radical terrorism, various types of challenges to human security and new 
types of warfare; but perhaps the greatest challenge is not to the community as such but 
to the values on which the system is based, and thus one of the greatest problems is 
 9 
managing the predominance of ‘American hegemony’ (Cottey 2007, 32). The continuers 
are well aware of the two major potential contradictions within the European security 
community: the tension between its identity and preferred practices and those of the 
American component of the system; and the divergence between the war-making essence 
of NATO (although constrained by its initial defensive character) and its evolution 
towards more of a political-military alliance system. As the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) is increasingly articulated, the tensions could be exacerbated; but 
this is to assume that the norms of the EU as a peace building project come to 
predominate. It is quite conceivable that the enlargement process and the neighbourhood 
policy, rather than expressing the pacific norms of the original EU, could become subject 
to a reverse adaptation: Europeanisation could give way to militarisation, albeit with a 
European face. 
This, certainly was the fear of what we can call the ‘innovators’, with Russia in 
the van, who argue that the institutions designed to guarantee Europe’s security in the 
Cold War are inappropriate for the new era. Indeed, the innovators argue that the 
instruments of security have paradoxically become the source of tension and conflict, and 
ultimately provoked the cold peace. At the minimum, Russian critics argue that Europe 
has failed to stand up for its own interests, and instead allowed itself to be subsumed into 
an Atlanticism that ultimately undermines its proclaimed values (Karaganov (ed.) 2008).  
Thus instead of acting as an independent subject, the European security system has fallen 
prey to the hegemonic aspect of the international order. It is for this reason that Russia 
proposed a new security system to supersede the post-war system, to to achieve a type of 
mark-2 Kellogg-Briand pact. Medvedev’s call for a new European security treat (later 
dubbed Helsinki-2 or Helsinki-plus) in Berlin on 5 June 2008 reflected this aspiration. 




Russia’s inventiveness, however, takes a distinctive form. The tensions accompanying 
the search for a new relationship between Russia and what is conventionally called the 
West gave rise ultimately to a growing clamour for innovation, which in Russia takes the 
form of neo-revisionism. Russia makes no claim to revise the existing international order, 
but in a paradoxical inversion of the original Helsinki process, demands that the leading 
powers abide by the mutually-established rules of the international system, as well as 
claiming a leading place in that system. It is for this reason that Russia is far from being a 
consistently revisionist power, accompanied by balancing strategies to counter the 
hegemonic powers, but neither is it resigned to permanent bandwagoning. It is this 
unstable and complex middle path that shapes Russia’s policy . It is ready (for the time 
being at least) to endorse American hegemony, as long as what it perceives to be its vital 
interests and prestige are recognised, accompanied by attempts to ‘flatten’ what is 
perceived to be the exaggerated prominence of the post-Cold War hegemonic 
constellation. 
 The attempt by outsiders to break in to the core of an existing hegemonic order has 
historically been accompanied by wars, which in the end have accelerated power shifts 
both within the hegemonic system and in relations with the challengers (Hurrell 2007). 
Germany and Japan were challenger powers from the late nineteenth century, a role now 
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played by China. The first two ultimately became overtly revisionist powers, while China’s 
‘quiet rise’ disguises any revisionist ambitions that it may have. Russia today is not ‘an 
emerging power’ in the traditional sense, and thus its putative rise has less of a revisionist 
character (MacFarlane 2006, 43). Russia does not challenge the existing world order, but 
only the place accorded to it in that order. It wishes not to destroy the existing constitution 
of international society but to modify it in a way that would give Russia what is perceived 
to be its due weight and to ensure that the hegemonic powers apply their normative 
declarations to themselves (Sakwa, 2011, from which this section draws). 
This was precisely the issue which prompted Putin’s outburst at the Munich 
Conference on Security Policy on 10 February 2007. Putin’s speech revealed deep 
disappointment that his attempts to engage with the West had been treated so 
superciliously. He stressed the ‘universal, indivisible character of security’ and warned 
against the dangers of establishing a ‘unipolar world … in which there is one master, one 
sovereign’ while noting ‘those who teach us [about democracy] do not want to learn 
themselves’. Putin listed a range of strategic problems, including the marginalisation of 
the UN, failure to ratify the adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty 
(initially signed in Paris between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on 19 
November 1990, with the adapted version signed at the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit in Istanbul on 19 November 1999), the 
remilitarisation of Europe through missile defence development, NATO enlargement that 
represented ‘a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust’, the weakening 
of the non-proliferation regime and the attempt ‘to transform the OSCE into a vulgar 
instrument to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries’ (Putin 
2007). The speech reflected the disenchantment of the Russian leader that the West 
appeared to dismiss Russian concerns as illegitimate and acted with a reckless impunity 
(as in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003) that now provoked Russia’s backlash. 
This was accompanied by the reassertion of a specific understanding of 
sovereignty, both at home and abroad. Vladislav Surkov, the chief ideologue of the Putin 
system, defined sovereign democracy as ‘a form of political life of society, under which 
the authorities, their organs and actions are selected, formed and directed exclusively by 
the Russian nation in all its variety and completeness so that all citizens, social groups 
and peoples comprising it achieve material well-being, freedom and justice…’ (Surkov 
2007, 31-32). This stresses the autonomous character of Russian democratic development 
(drawing, however obliquely, on a type of Schmittean decisionism); but at the same time 
there is a second theme implicit in the message: the autonomy of the regime from society. 
In that respect, sovereign democracy perpetuates the thinking behind the ‘managed 
democracy’ that was characteristic of Putin’s first presidential term. At the heart of both 
concepts is the view that democracy is an evolutionary process, and the revolutionary 
view of a leap to democracy based on the mechanical application of Western norms, 
which is framed as having been typical of the first post-communist decade, is rejected. 
Addressing a conference of United Russia activists on 7 February 2006, Surkov stressed 
that sovereign democracy was more than an abstract concept but the basis for praxis 
(Surkov 2006). Thus sovereign democracy espouses a view of autonomous mimetic 
learning and adaptation; but the failure to substantiate the implied programme of the 
development of appropriate Russian institutions of citizenship and political representation 
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reduces mimesis to mere mimicry, leading to the development of a form of ‘imitation 
democracy’ (Furman 2008). 
Expectations of an easy transition from one type of historicity and spatiality to 
another in the post-communist era were disappointed. Instead, Russia entered into a period 
of intensified liminality, accompanied by a pervasive sense of victimhood. In his annual 
report on the work of the government, delivered to parliament on 20 April 2011, Putin 
talked about the effects of the economic crisis, which he insisted came to Russia from 
outside:  
 
The lesson all of us should learn is that economic and government weakness and 
susceptibility to external shocks inevitably threaten sovereignty. We all know 
very well that, let’s be honest, if you are weak, there will always be someone who 
will be eager to advise you on where to move, which policy to pursue and which 
development path to choose. These seemingly friendly and unobtrusive 
recommendations may look good, but in point of fact they camouflage diktat and 
gross interference in the affairs of sovereign states. We are perfectly aware of this 
(Putin 2011b). 
 
The Putinite narrative suggests that the crisis have been the result of Western bad faith 
and a consistent refusal to take Russia’s legitimate interests and concerns into account. 
There is something in this, but clearly it is an inadequate account  and fails to encompass 
Russia’s own contradictions in engaging with the values it propounds. The recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia may have been forced on 26 August 2008, yet even as a 
response to the recognition of the Kosovan declaration of independence in February of 
that year it entailed a deviation from Russia’s own state sovereignty discourses. Equally, 
Russia’s fitful implementation of the obligations that it freely assumed on joining the 
Council of Europe, above all the independence of the judiciary to defend individual 
rights, can be laid at no-one’s door other than its own. Putinite victim discourses are used 
instrumentally to consolidate a regime whose own legitimacy was increasingly 
challenged, especially because of the manipulation of electoral outcomes.  
Traditional liberalism has long understood that free elections and other 
institutional arrangements of representative democracy require an adequate social and 
economic context to be able to work effectively (Gellner and Cansino (eds) 1996). 
Anything else can be termed, to use Anatol Lieven’s phrase (2007), ‘democratism’, an 
analogy he draws with the ‘actually existing socialism’ of the Brezhnev and Honecker 
years. The concept of sovereign democracy, which as we have seen was devised during 
the Putin presidency in the mid-2000s to emphasise Russia’s autochthonous path to 
democracy, at least had the merit of recognising the problem of mechanical adaptation, 
but when tempered by the heavy-handed managerialism of ‘managed democracy’, its 
domestic emancipatory potential was vitiated. All that remained was its external aspect, 
notably resistance not only to American liberal internationalism but also to a particular 
way of thinking about two issues in particular: the assumption that the interests of a 
particular state are synonymous with universal morality and needs; and that democracy 
can be disembedded from a particular context and imposed (by force if necessary) from 
outside. The Iraq adventure was evidence enough of the latter proposition.  
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It has now become a platitude to argue that American democracy promotion has 
been used as a way of pursuing American policy to suit its interests, and in particular as a 
means not only to attack Russian foreign policy independence, but also quite overtly as 
an instrument in the struggle for mastery over former Soviet space (cf Barany and Moser 
2009). Sovereign democracy is thus a riposte to American democratic evangelism and to 
the concept of democratism, but it is inadequately balanced by the development of 
authentic forms of domestic democratic political integration. The interaction of 
international dynamics and domestic development are always complex, but reaching back 
to Kozyrev’s management of foreign policy it is clear that in post-communist Russia the 
dialectic has been particularly intense. Whether Russia would have developed differently 
if the West had been more amenable to Russian concerns  remains a moot point. Obama’s 
reset did allow Medvedev’s modernisation agenda to flourish, but ultimately the failure to 
reform the administrative system, accompanied by Putin’s return to the presidency in 
2012 (an event about which America scarcely bothered to hide its distaste), was driven by 
domestic factors. 
Russia’s neo-revisionism is more than mere ressentiment, reflecting the hurt of 
the weak and the outcast, but frustration that the international society as constituted at the 
close of the Cold War had been unable to adapt to the new circumstances. Without the 
Soviet Union to restrain them, the hegemonic powers now behaved with hubristic 
messianism, or so it seemed to Moscow, and thereby undermined the principles that were 
so loudly proclaimed to lie at the core of their model of international society. Karaganov 
calls this the weakening of ‘self-deterrence’, the constraints that were placed on the 
behaviour of the Western powers by the mere existence of the Soviet Union as an 
alternative pole in the international system. As he puts it, ‘When Russia was temporarily 
disabled and could not present a serious threat of escalation, self-deterrence softened, and 
the US ran off the rails’, doing things that were unthinkable before, such as bombing 
Yugoslavia (twice, in 1995 and 1999) without a UN mandate (Karaganov 2011). 
To that extent, Russia has emerged as the defender of a pluralistic world order 
based on the norms of international society as they had developed in the post-war years. 
It is this agenda that lies at the core of Russia’s neo-revisionism. Buoyed by energy rents 
from the mid-2000s, Russia’s policy undoubtedly became more assertive, but it was not 
overtly aggressive in the sense of wanting to change the existing balance of power in the 
international system. The five-day war with Georgia in August 2008 can be seen in this 
light, as Russia’s response to the threat of NATO enlargement to Georgia and Ukraine. 
Equally, the policy does not exclude engagement, as occurred following Obama’s ‘reset’ 
of relations with Russia in 2009. Russia remains a joiner, in that its membership of the 
Council of Europe and other normatively-driven international organisations is not in 
question, and after an arduous process at last joined the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) in December 2011. 
Despite much commentary to the effect that Russia wishes to be a ‘norm-maker’ 
and not just a ‘norm-taker’ (Haukkala 2008), my model of neo-revisionism suggests that 
this exaggerates the challenge contemporary Russia poses to the existing norms of 
international society. Russia remains a status quo power, but its claim to be a norm-
enforcer and not just a norm-taker challenges the hegemonic powers to subordinate 
themselves to their own norms. The essence of Russia’s neo-revisionism lies not in 
generating a new set of norms but resides in the sphere of practical diplomacy, where its 
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foreign policy autonomy (and of other rising powers) constrains the freedom of 
manoeuvre of the old dominant constellation. Russia does not advance any substantive 
new norms to govern international order, but it consistently insists that the existing rules 
have to be obeyed by all powers, great and small. 4 This may well be a traditional 
‘weapon of the weak’, but is no less effective for that.From a status quo power Russia 
claimed to be a norm-enforcer and not just a norm-taker. Russia does not advance any 
substantive new norms to govern international order, but it consistently insists that the 
existing rules have to be obeyed by all powers, great and small. The essence of neo-
revisionism is not the attempt to create new rules or to dangle a vision of a new 
international order, but to ensure the universal application of existing norms in at most a 
modified international system. As far as Russia was concerned, the Georgian war 
demonstrated the systemic degradation of the post-Cold War order and the reassertion of 
geopolitical contestation. The Bush presidency was accompanied by great power rivalry, 
the militarisation of international politics and the structural erosion of the post-
communist peace accompanied by elements of a post-ideological Cold War, what is 
called in this article a cold peace (for the tone of the period, see Lucas 2008; also 
Bugajski 2004). 
There is a more profound element in the contemporary stalemate between 
innovation and continuation, cooperation and antagonism. The new twenty years’ crisis 
emerges out of the very nature of the anti-revolutions of 1989-91. These revolutions 
repudiated the logic of what went before, and not just the facts of the previous era, but 
have not generated a substantive agenda of their own. Instead, the ‘return to Europe’ 
posited the uncritical (mechanical) adoption of the existing Western structures of 
domestic and international order. This satisfied the long-term aspirations of the 
conformist powers of Eastern Europe, happy to be part of the West’s continuation 
agenda, but it could not be an appropriate strategy for contestatory Russia. It is for this 
reason that the learning process in Russia remains imitative and lacks an Aristotelian 
mimetic character. As far as its elites were concerned, the ontological basis for a new 
‘normality’ based on mechanical integration with the leading institutions of contemporary 
Western modernity, the EU and NATO, were absent. However, Russia’s attempts to 
generate an alternative adaptive strategy encountered bewilderment in the West, 
provoked in part by astonishment that the triumphant Western ‘normality’ should be 
challenged at all.  
Thus, Russia has inconsistently yet persistently tried to revise the international 
order, but without repudiating substantively the grounds of that order. Russia has called 
for the creation of a European security system no longer based on NATO; the reservation 
of a certain ‘privileged’ status in post-Soviet Eurasia; defended versions of ‘sovereign 
democracy’ in its neighbours, notably Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, based on an 
ideology of legitimism; launched a ‘soft power’ campaign in the West based on certain 
normative assertions, managed by a range of public affairs consultancies; questioned not 
only the efficacy but also the legitimacy of the OSCE and its institutions, particularly its 
                                                 
4 This was repeated in various forms at the time of western intervention in Libya from March 
2011. As Putin noted in his ‘crusader’ speech on 21 March 2011, which was broadcast on RT, ‘I 
am worried about the ease with which decisions are being made to use force in international 
affairs nowadays’, reproduced in CEPS, European Neighbourhood Watch, Issue 69, March 2011, 
p. 6. 
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election-monitoring agency; and intervened forcefully in Georgia in 2008 to put a halt to 
NATO enlargement. Much of this was defensive and reactive, yet the kernel of an 
alternative vision of world order is tangible. Russia began to outline the ontological 
grounding for an alternative ‘normality’. However, the lack of a substantive ideational 
basis for this alternative reveals the structural constraints keeping Russia trapped in the 
neo-revisionist complex: neither fully a member of the Western community but neither its 
systemic antagonist.  
Russian neo-revisionism does not challenge the fundamental postulates of the 
international system based on a systemic or ideological critique, and neither does it 
consistently challenge the existing rules of the international game. It does not propose the 
full-scale revision of contemporary practices and principles, many of which it was (in its 
Soviet or Russian guise) a constitutive associate. Thus Russia is a permanent member of 
the Security Council, a privilege that it seeks neither to renounce nor dilute. Equally, 
Russia was a founder member of the increasingly ramified Helsinki process, although it 
has certainly become a critic of some of the practices of the OSCE. This brings us full-
square to the ontological basis of neo-revisionism: Russia’s perception that the norms and 
institution of contemporary international order have been ‘privatised’ by  a group of 
leading states, and in a restatement of Carr’s classical paradigm, particular interests are 
pursued in the guise of universal principles. The universalistic postulates of Wilsonian 
idealism once again come up against particularistic concerns.  
 
The problem of universalism 
 
Universalism is the process that in contemporary international politics is epitomised by 
the adoption in 1948 by the United Nations of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The Soviet Union, like much of the Islamic world, was profoundly ambiguous 
about the Declaration, considering it largely as the concretisation of western values, yet 
ultimately signed up. The universalistic agenda received a massive boost in the Final 
Declaration of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
in August 1975. The Soviet Union  and its allies were forced to accept the ‘third basket’ 
agenda of human rights in exchange for the benefits of baskets one (mutual recognition of 
existing borders and a range of confidence building measures) and two (economic 
goods). The Helsinki principles were thereafter used by human rights activists in the 
Soviet bloc as a measure against which the behaviour of their governments could be 
measured, notably in the Charter 77 movement in Czechoslovakia and the various 
Helsinki monitoring bodies in the USSR and elsewhere. 
 
Neo-revisionism as a critique of teleological universalism 
 
The cold peace demonstrates once again the power of symbols and the social imaginary. 
The original Cold War intensified the pressure to conform and revere the symbols of 
American democracy, notably the constitution, and enforced a range of allegiance-
intensifying social practices, exploited to the full by Senator Joseph McCarthy and the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities in the early 1950s.  The Cold War in the 
popular imagination was more than an international policy to constrain a threatening 
power but became part of a crusade to defend the American way of life, democracy and 
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the free world. The roots of this lie in Woodrow Wilson’s interventionist liberalism even 
before he became president, in response to the Mexican revolution and and America’s 
intervention. Wilson’s ideational leadership fused the export of democracy and American 
geopolitical interests. The Cold War accentuated these features, to the point that Hartz 
could talk about ‘liberal absolutism’ (Hartz 1955). The symbolic dimension of 
international politics was vividly illustrated by the Truman administration’s exaggerated 
and demonstrative use of the term ‘totalitarianism’ (Gleason 1995, 81). The aim was to 
blacken its protagonist and hence enhance its own status as the singular exemplar of 
civilisational totality. The spread of the ideology of democracy became part of the state’s 
global mission, and with its allies joined in a global crusade to defend and advance a set 
of civilisational values (Rossbach 1999). 
Although post-communist Russia is ostensibly a child of the Helsinki process, 
with the 1990 Charter of Paris the manifesto of post-communism in the region and many 
of the drafters of the Russian constitution were activists in the Helsinki tradition, Russia 
today is highly ambivalent about the whole Helsinki experience. This sustains the neo-
revisionist critique of the practices of the dominant powers in the international system. 
While the Yeltsin leadership in the 1990s sought to make what had become in 1994 the 
OSCE the premier security organisation on the continent and endorsed the work of its 
various agencies, including the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) based in Warsaw, today (as mentioned) Russia seeks to revise ‘Helsinki 1’ in 
some sort of ‘Helsinki Plus’ process. The aim was to universalise universalism.  
This is the model advanced by Carl Schmitt in 1950 in a book whose full title is: 
The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum. The 
work extols the virtues of the Westphalia order, a ‘spatial, political and legal order (the 
‘nomos of the earth’) embodied in the jus publicum Europaeum’, which in his view 
underwent a process of dissolution since the end of the nineteenth century to the First 
World War. The book anticipated the dangers that arose from the ‘hegemonic global 
interventionism of the United States of America, the effects of de-concretisation and 
universalisation of international law (that is, of ‘order’ without explicit spatial 
grounding), of diminishing pluralism in the international system, as well as the evolution 
of partisan warfare and terrorism’ (Odysseos and Petitio 2007, 1). Key terms include the 
bracketing of war (thus opposed to just war theory); the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 and a 
different form of political subjectivity, reflected in American ideas of Grossraum (greater 
space); and the journey from isolationism to (Wilsonian) universalism, accompanied by 
today’s ‘humanitarian interventionism’. As Odysseos and Petitio put it in their 
introduction to the work, ‘liberalism attempts to turn the pluriverse of international 
politics into a universe, in which the effects of difference are controlled from a “meta-
sovereign” site through current US-driven attempts to reformulate international law by 
conferring a special status on liberal democracies, as well as by reintroducing a 
“discriminatory concept of war” in the form of a right to different forms of intervention 
to preventive ones’ (Odysseos and Petitio 2007, 13).  
Today this takes the form of an enhanced sense of normative superiority, 
reinforced by alleged victory over the protagonist in the Cold War. Raymond Geuss notes 
the strong Kantian taint to contemporary international politics. ‘This strand’, he writes, 
‘expresses itself in the highly moralised tone in which some public diplomacy is 
conducted, at any rate in the English-speaking world, and also in the popularity among 
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political philosophers of the slogan “politics is applied ethics”. He stresses the ‘slickly 
ambiguous’ nature of such a view. On the one hand, politics is not a value-free sphere of 
activity and hence judgement and ‘ethics’ are intrinsically bound up in human 
interactions (the ‘anodyne reading’ according to Geuss) (Geuss 2008, 1). However, the 
‘applied ethics’ approach in his view is objectionable because of its attempt to implement 
an ‘ideal theory’ of ethics, separate from real life, based on the Kantian view that ethics 
can be entirely non-empirical, based completely on ‘the mere notion of rational agency, 
and the absolute consistency of willing that is purportedly the defining characteristic of 
any rational agent. Kantian ethics is supposed to be completely universal in its 
application to all agents in all historical situations’ (Geuss 2008, 7). Geuss sums up his 
view as follows: ‘The view I am rejecting assumes that one can complete the work of 
ethics first, attaining an ideal theory of how we should act, and then in a second step, one 
can apply that ideal theory to the action of political agents’ (Geuss 2008, 8). 
Geuss’s alternative is based on four principles for political philosophy: it should 
be realist (p. 9); it should recognise that politics is above all about ‘action and the 
contexts of action’ (p. 11); that politics is historically located (p. 13); and, finally, that 
politics ‘is more like the exercise of a craft or art, than like traditional conceptions of 
what happens when a theory is applied’ (p. 15). This is in effect an Aristotelian  mimetic 
theory of international ethics, a historically grounded learning process based on 
reciprocity rather than a one-dimensional exercise in geopolitical pedagogy. In practice 
this would entail, for example, America pursuing a policy that puts American interests 
first in its relations with Russia rather than seeking to mould Russia to some 
predetermined policy or normative agenda. Ethics are not thereby jettisoned (the crude 
understanding of an interest-based foreign policy) but are applied in an ‘anodyne’ 
manner, respecting the subjectivity of others while upholding their own normative values. 
Ethics are not thereby jettisoned (the crude understanding of an interest-based foreign 
policy) but their ‘anodyne’ application, respecting the subjectivity of other while 
upholding in a Geussian way its own normative values. 
 
From universalism to ‘pluriversalism’ 
 
The global ‘civil war’ between 1917 and 1989 only occluded the fundamental tension, 
which has emerged so starkly in the post-Cold War era, between universalism and 
pluralism. In internal politics, as Chantal Mouffe (1999, 2005) and others long argued, 
the unchallenged Anglo-American hegemony stifled ‘the political’, the ability of real 
problems to find agonistic forms of discourse in the public sphere; and on the global scale 
this has distorted the practice of ‘the international’, and instead seeks to impose a ‘pre-
ordered’ form of hegemony. The respatialisation of the international arena, as advanced 
by the idea of ‘sovereign democracy’, gives valance to a range of political actors, above 
all states, who are no longer ranked in terms of their relationship with the hegemon, but 
which can now substantiate alternative forms of engagement with the ‘civilisation of 
modernity’, to use Eisenstadt’s term (2001, 325). The revalorisation of a multiplicity of 
actors entails the revival of ‘the political’ at the level of ‘the international’. This provokes 
a crisis of world order, in which Russia is the main protagonist of a different ‘nomos of 
the earth’, what it calls multi-polarity but which in Schmittean terms is a pluriverse. This 
meta-view of international affairs tempers and shapes interactions in all aspects of 
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Russia’s foreign policy and provides the theoretical grounding for the concept of the 
contemporary cold peace. 
 The post-communist era is based on the logic of a fundamental asymmetry: the 
active repudiation of one set of principles and the passive acceptance of another. Sheldon 
Wolin (2008, 37) notes the process of ‘anticommunism as mimesis: the character of the 
enemy supplied the norm for the power demands that the democratic defender of the free 
world chose to impose on itself’. A ‘superpower’ is defined by Wolin (p. 40) ‘as an 
imaginary of power that emerges from defeat unchastened, more imperious than ever’. 
The ‘War’ in the abstract has been declared, while the reality of great power rivalry is 
occluded (Wolin, 2008, 31). It is this period that is now coming to an end, a time whose 
demise was hastened by Russia’s emergence as a neo-revisionist state, accompanied by 
fundamental shifts in the balance of world power. Russia’s attempt to devise a neo-
revisionist path between being a passive norm-taker and an aggressive norm-maker takes 
the form of presenting itself as a norm-enforcer.  
Russia’s insistence on respect for the traditional repertoire of international law, 
above all adherence to territorial and governmental sovereignty is vitiated by its own 
behaviour, but this behaviour is not based on the consistent presentation of a set of 
alternative norms. Russia constitutes itself not as a separate ‘order’ but seeks to 
contribute to the creation of a more genuinely ‘pluriversal’ international society, 
consisting of different and equally legitimate systems. The degree to which it is a 
consistent practitioner of the nomos that it proclaims is of course questionable, and in 
certain respects Russia reproduces the tropes of its mimetic competitors. It thus 
constitutes itself as a counter-hegemonic power operating in the manner of its 
protagonist. 
The debate is a fundamental one and can be couched in terms of a tension 
between Weberian and Durkheimian approaches to political order. For the Weberian, 
reflected in the Putinite model of state reconstitution, the emphasis is on asserting ‘the 
monopoly over legitimate use of force within a given territory’ (a classical sovereignty-
centred model of political authority) accompanied by the imposition of bureaucratic 
uniformity and rational administration. The Durkheimian approach, by contrast, 
emphasises the values and character of the regime, and thus feeds into liberal discourses 
on the importance of equal and inclusive citizenship, precluding the arrogation of tutelary 
sovereignty by the administrative regime. Iver Neumann argues for the crucial 
importance of this variable, as well as the quality of governance (couched by him in 
terms of the practices of governmentality). In particular, he argues, the Russian state is 
reluctant to relinquish its direct imposition of power over society, and hesitates to accept 
a liberal dynamic of a self-managing society working indirectly with the state (Neumann 
2008). It is precisely at this point that the incommensurable nomoi of universalism and 
pluriversalism in international affairs collide. 
 This helps contextualise current debates about Russia’s relations with external 
actors. Some of the most interesting work in analysing Russia’s relations with the EU is 
based on the idea of competing rationalities (Averre 2008). This could be couched in 
traditional terms as the logic of competing interests, with the interests themselves 
reflecting the socio-economic characteristics of the state, its elite structure and self-
representation. The competing political rationalities approach finesses the stale 
juxtaposition of a tension between ‘values’ and ‘interests’ and opens up fruitful terrain 
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for investigation. However, the notion of political rationality has to be grounded in some 
theoretical context, and clearly the classic one is the Weberian approach. We are here not 
dealing so much with his classic threefold categorisation of traditional, charismatic and 
legal-rational forms of political legitimacy within a state, but the rationality that a state or 
nascent political subject (like the EU) as a complex system of orders exhibits in its 
interaction with other subjects of the international system. Any system of rationality is 
embedded in representations of the system in which they operate. As far as Russia is 
concerned, there is not one international order but many, what we label the pluriverse 
view but which in classic Primakovian terms of the 1990s was known as multipolarity. 
 Both Russia and the EU (and the West in general), from this perspective, 
represent different but equally legitimate political logics; and by extension, both the 
continuer and innovator viewpoints are perfectly rational strategies. It is their 
fundamental incompatibility that provokes the cold peace. At a different level, this is 
captured by Nye’s view of different ‘narratives’ of power (Nye 2011); what in 
Foucauldian terms could be considered discourses. Russia is making proposals not just 
about the management of global governance, but specifically about European 
governance, focused not just on the EU’s ‘external governance’ agenda, but on Europe 
itself as a multiverse. In this arrangement the EU has to share continental space with 
Russia and Turkey, and some other smaller powers; and by doing so, changes the EU’s 
identity in a fundamental manner. No longer can it present itself as the only peace project 
in Europe, or its model of governance as the only rational one but is forced to come to 
terms with Europe’s re-emergence as a microcosm of multipolarity. This represents a 
geopolitical shift with profound implications as the EU, Russia and Turkey are forced to 
find new forms to manage the return of multipolarity in Europe, no longer based on great 
powers alone but on possibly incommensurate political projects.. 
In recognising the Schmittean subjectivity of others and asserting its own, there 
can however be no return in this pluriverse to a nineteenth century world of clearly 
delineated competing great powers. The notion of ‘order’, a relatively stable set of 
relations between states, and ‘governance’ issues, cannot simply trump the constructivist 
view of the mutual recognition and constitution of identity and difference. Equally, the 
tension between civilisational issues, defined as different cultural perspectives on 
sovereignty and legitimacy, and diplomatic ‘realist’ ambitions remain central to foreign 
policy management, even if shaped by the larger vision of ‘the international’. The 
civilisational perspective does not necessarily see Russia locked in a permanent contest 
with other social formations; yet it does suggest a particular character to the international 
that informs the operation of universal norms. The neo-revisionist agenda gives Russia’s 
distinctive engagement with the civilisation of modernity substance and character that 
complements those generated in the West. It is a mimetic strategy with the potential to 
transform the mechanical appropriation of existing universalist agendas into organic 
adaptation through plural representations of international order. In other words, 
contemporary actors may transcend the mimetic cold war to establish a genuine warm 
peace; but the continued application of ethicised hegemonic strategies could provoke the 
return of the Cold War to international politics. 
 
Conclusion: liminality and mimesis 
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Post-Cold War asymmetries have provoked a permanent crisis in Russo-Western relations, 
with debilitating effects in post-Soviet Eurasia. The crisis takes institutional form in the 
continuing debate between continuers and innovators. The post-Cold War era remains 
liminal, in the sense that no stable new order has been established to which all the parties 
are committed. On the one side, Russia is certainly not a fully-fledged revisionist power. 
The basis for its new assertiveness is not an attempt to change the normative basis of the 
existing world order, but the claim that its equal participation in that system has not been 
fully acknowledged. The existing system, from the point of view of the innovators, is 
considered to embody a fundamental asymmetry: the extension of a system devised for 
one purpose – to contain the USSR and to advance the norms of the Western alliance 
system – into a new era and new territories, a temporal and spatial extension that 
generates tension rather than extending security. 
In the post-communist era Russia tried to adapt to a normality that is itself in 
crisis, a crisis that is exacerbated by Russia’s critique of that normality. Russia represents 
a parallel sphere where the conscience and bad faith of our era are played out, both in 
terms of its critique of contemporary international order, and also in its contradictory 
application of that critique. The contemporary international system is based less on a 
‘liberal peace’ than on the structural power of the hegemonic system. This naturally 
generates resistance, which so far does not go beyond the neo-revisionism of the cold 
peace but contains the potential for systemic conflict. This is accompanied in Russia by 
an intensified demand on the past to provide legitimacy and the ordering principles for the 
post-communist present. Lacking a basis in the present, there is an intensified demand on 
the past to provide legitimacy and the ordering principles for the post-communist present. 
This provokes attempts to revalorise important aspects of the communist past, and that is 
why the struggle over history textbooks and the politics of memory have become so critical 
in Russian public discourse, and, more generally, why discourses of victimhood have 
become so central in the reconstituted national narratives of so many post-communist 
states. It is not temporal issues, however, that are is the ultimate source of the cold peace, 
but incommensurable representations of geopolitical space. Russia’s ‘revolt’ against 
Western hegemonic institutions has fostered some profound debates about pluralism in the 
international system and some ideas for their modification. Its critique, however, is not 
grounded in a developed vision of an alternative order, like some reasoned new second-
worldist project, and thus Russia is a neo-revisionist power rather than an out-and-out 
revisionist force. Russia’s relationship with the West has thus become mimetic, adapting to 
the normality practised there while simultaneously subjecting it to a critique that 
nevertheless fails to generate a substantive alternative. Russia’s relationship with the West 
has thus become mimetic, adapting to its normality while simultaneously subjecting it to a 
critique that fails to generate a substantive alternative. Typically, Russia’s critique only 
strengthens the West, which is a fundamental characteristic of mimetic power. 
At the boundaries of the structured forms of West European civilisation, Russia is 
an uncomfortable member of the club of European powers. The formal end of the Cold 
War in 1989-91 did not put an end to profound cultural and civilisational ambiguities in 
Russia’s relations with the West, and these took the form of a cold peace. This was 
exacerbated by the residual ‘crusader’ structure to the thinking of key Western states. The 
context had clearly changed, and with it the modalities of struggle: but the practices of a 
global enlargement of the values embedded in the dominant hegemonic formation 
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remained. This took on new rhetorical forms, notably a renewed emphasis on human 
rights and democratic elections, and in certain respects broadened out to become more of 
an inclusive process. Some of the hard axiological edge of the Cold War era was 
dropped, and the aim now was to facilitate the passage of former adversaries into the 
community of the just. For most of the former eastern European communist countries this 
provided a welcome opportunity to reorient their policies and ultimately they became part 
of the expanded Western community. However, the process was far from unproblematic 
in post-Soviet Eurasia, where it encountered civilisational resistance and problems of 
mimetic adaptation. Out of this emerged the cold peace; but it also provides grounds for 
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